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Tuna is one of the few renewable resources
available on a large scale for Pacific island
countries, and many countries want to develop
onshore value-adding processing to generate
more domestic economic development from tuna
fisheries in the region. The case of Soltai Fishing
and Processing (formerly Solomon Taiyo Ltd)
provides many useful lessons about the benefits
and pitfalls of this development strategy.
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The Central Bank of Solomon Islands has
identified fisheries, especially tuna, as one
of the sectors with the greatest potential to
contribute to economic development in
Solomon Islands (Central Bank of Solomon
Islands 2005). This was apparent as far back
1970, when the British colonial government
was looking to develop industries in
addition to copra and logging for the
development of the Solomon Islands
economy. In 1973, the Solomon Islands
Governing Council ratified a joint venture
agreement with the Tokyo-based
multinational Taiyô Gyogyô Kabushiki
Kaisha, then the largest fishing company in
the world. It was hoped that this initiative in
tuna fishing and processing operations, as
well as the declaration of a 200 nautical mile
exclusive economic zone, would establish
economic dependence for the Solomon
Islands. Such hopes were raised by ideas of
a new international economic order which,
prompted by the success of the oil-producing
OPEC countries, foresaw decolonised states
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exercising their new-found sovereignty by
selling commodities to generate wealth and
development. Pacific island countries had
great expectations of what could be achieved
from their tuna resources (Schurman 1998).
In 1998, Solomon Islands’ fisheries
exports (mostly tuna, of which Solomon Taiyo
was the largest single exporter) peaked at
SBD$194.18 million and, together with log
exports (SBD$196.27 million), contributed to
total exports worth SBD$608.27 million
(Central Bank of Solomon Islands 2001:88).
Solomon Taiyo Ltd was at the time one of the
largest, and longest running, locally based
tuna fishing and processing companies in
the Pacific.
Previously, I have argued that, even
though the company received ongoing
subsidies and donor assistance, Solomon
Taiyo contributed greatly to the Solomon
Islands economy (Barclay 2000). It was the
second largest employer after the
government in an economy where only 10
per cent of the working population is
formally employed and unemployment is
considered a root cause of many social
problems (Central Bank of Solomon Islands
2001:16). In addition, the company generated
export earnings and launched a number of
spin-off businesses.
In 2000, during the period of social and
political upheaval known as ‘the tensions’,
the Japanese partner company pulled out of
Solomon Taiyo,1 responding to the difficult
business conditions in the country and a
significant fall in world tuna prices. Tuna
fishing in Solomon Islands was scaled back.
Production dropped by 55.9 per cent and the
value of formal fisheries exports dropped by
77 per cent (Central Bank of Solomon Islands
2001:18, 28). Collapse of the tuna industry
thus contributed heavily to the overall
economic disorder in Solomon Islands as
GDP declined in real terms by 14 per cent
(Central Bank of Solomon Islands 2001:16).
Workers laid off from Solomon Taiyo
comprised more than 2,000 of the 8,000 jobs
lost during the tensions (Central Bank of
Solomon Islands 2001:16). In 2001, the
government restarted the venture, without a
Japanese partner, as Soltai Fishing and
Processing.
Background
Solomon Taiyo started in 1973 with a shore
base in Tulagi, the pre-World War II capital
of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate.
The company opened a small fishing base in
Noro, Western Province, in 1975. This base
expanded to become the company’s main
operating centre in 1991, when Tulagi was
closed. The head office remained in Honiara.
The Noro base included a cannery, a large
cold store, wharves and repair shops for the
fleet, a fish meal plant, a waste water
processing plant, and a smoking factory that
produced katsuobushi—a flavouring widely
used in Japanese cuisine. Solomon Taiyo had
a fleet of around 20 pole-and-line vessels and
one group seiner. The company employed
people from around the country, and a
handful of expatriates in management roles.
Solomon Taiyo was jointly owned by the
Solomon Islands government and Taiyô
Gyogyô (which changed its name to Maruha
Corporation in 1993), with the government
holding 51 per cent of the shares and Taiyô
Gyogyô holding the balance. The company’s
main market in terms of value was sales of
high-quality canned tuna to British
supermarket chains, including Sainsbury’s.
Because Solomon Taiyo’s fleet mostly
employed the pole-and-line method of
fishing, which specifically targets certain
species (with a low bycatch) and cannot take
entire schools of fish (as does net fishing), it
could be marketed as ‘environmentally
friendly’. Pole-and-line fishing is less efficient
than purse-seining—the main method used
to catch skipjack tuna for canning—but niche
marketing in Britain meant that the
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company’s product still had a market among
consumers willing to pay higher prices for a
pole-and-line product.2
From Solomon Taiyo to Soltai
Solomon Taiyo was not financially successful
even before 2000: small profits in some years
offset losses in others. Installation of the new
factory in Noro in 1991 generated a one-off
large loss, but the company slowly recovered
profitability during the 1990s. The company
covered its costs, while its financial structure
enabled both shareholders—Maruha and
the Solomon Islands government—to draw
money from the operating costs of the
company rather than waiting for a profit.3
A range of factors brought about the
demise of Solomon Taiyo in 2000. Average
world prices for frozen skipjack plummeted
from US$980 per metric tonne in 1998, to
US$550 in 1999 and US$326 in 2000 (Central
Bank of Solomon Islands 2001:18). Solomon
Taiyo’s niche market in the United Kingdom
dried up. Sainsbury’s retail strategy of
paying more for high-quality, socially and
ecologically responsible product was
undermined by more discount-driven
marketing. In 2000 Sainsbury’s changed their
buying strategy, informing Solomon Taiyo
that they would no longer pay a premium
price (pers. comm., M. Nakada, 11 July 2005).
Committed to pole-and-line fishing, largely
uncompetitive on general world tuna
markets, and receiving disastrously low
prices, Solomon Taiyo looked unlikely to
remain even remotely profitable.
At the same time, pressures were
building on the Japanese partner. Recession
continued in Japan throughout the 1990s,
prompting Maruha executives to question
the wisom of retaining non-profit making
ventures and financial liabilities, of which
Solomon Taiyo was an obvious example
(pers. comm., M. Nakada, 11 July 2005). Local
legend has it that when the President of Taiyô
Gyogyô visited Solomon Islands in the 1970s,
he made a moral commitment to keep
Solomon Taiyo going, even if it was not
profitable, as a gift to Solomon Islands. Some
managers in Maruha in 2000 felt that this
commitment should be honored, but the
balance of power within the company was
shifting towards the commercially rational
(pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
Maruha was thus flagging the possibility
of withdrawing from Solomon Taiyo even
before the height of the tensions (pers. comm.,
M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005). In mid 2000,
simmering outbreaks of violence on
Guadalcanal peaked in a coup that ousted
the Bartholomew Ulufa’alu government.
Solomon Taiyo continued operations longer
than other large companies, such as
Goldridge Mine and Solomon Islands
Plantations Limited, but eventually militants
disrupted fishing operations, ‘sea-jacking’ a
fishing boat and threatening the lives of the
Japanese nationals on board. The Okinawan
fishermen’s house in Noro was also looted
(pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005; pers.
comm., M. Nakada, 11 July 2005). The
Japanese media reported on events in
Solomon Islands, claiming that Maruha was
irresponsible for staying when all the other
large companies had already pulled out of
the country (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July
2005; pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July
2005). The company suspended operations,
closed its head office in Honiara and
evacuated senior management to Cairns to
wait and see what would transpire. Most of
the employees were retrenched. By the end
of 2000, Maruha had decided to pull out of
Solomon Taiyo.
On suspension of operations, the
company retained a core of around 170 of
the most experienced and skilled employees
at Noro to look after the facilities under the
leadership of Aseri Kukui, the Personnel and
Training Manager. The skeleton staff had
limited funds, and when these ran out they
started small production runs of canned
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product using the 100 metric tonnes of tuna
left in cold storage. When the frozen tuna
ran out, they pieced together a fishing crew
from the available employees and ran one of
the vessels to catch more tuna and continue
production. By late 2000, three vessels were
operating—a situation that continued
through Maruha’s decision to leave and until
arrangements were finalised for the company
to reopen as Soltai, the wholly government-
owned venture (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–
22 July 2005).
Before Soltai could start operations, it had
to renovate and repair the old Solomon Taiyo
facilities. Taiwan (Republic of China) came
to the rescue, granting aid seed funding of
SBD$8.6 million (US$1.7 million), which was
used mostly for basic repairs, maintenance
of the fleet, and materials for the cannery and
to bring back employees from their homes
around the country. In September 2001 Soltai
opened with an official ceremony in Noro
(pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005;
pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July  2005).
According to Soltai’s General Manager,
Milton Sibisopere, Maruha had stipulated
that their shareholding was to be given to
the Western Province government ‘in
recognition for all that the Western Province
had done for Solomon Taiyo’ (pers. comm.,
M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005). This meant
that 51 per cent of Soltai was owned by the
national government through the Investment
Corporation of Solomon Islands (ICSI), and
49 per cent by the Western Province
government.4 The Western Province
government was given two of the five seats
on the Board of Directors. The Honiara head
office was closed and its administrative staff
were moved to Noro.
The first couple of years of Soltai’s
operations saw record catches and a good
turnover. Soltai demonstrated that it could
meet its ongoing costs and manage
production of smoked katsuobushi loins sold
to Japan, and cans sold domestically and
regionally. Catches fell in 2003, however, and
remained low through to mid 2005 (pers.
comm., A. Wickham, 15 July 2005; pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).5 By
this time Soltai was in steep decline. The
Board of Directors had requested an injection
of SBD$20 million from the national
government to upgrade the shore base and
the fleet and was fighting off the National
Provident Fund’s efforts to sell the
company’s assets to recover defaulted loan
repayments.
Human resources
Soltai’s production had dropped, so it
employed fewer people than Solomon Taiyo
had, and paid out less in remuneration
(Tables 1 and 2). In addition, Soltai’s Board
of Directors had instituted a new human
resources policy. Solomon Taiyo’s human
resources policy had been based on a public
service model that distinguished between
salaried staff and workers paid an hourly
rate, both of whom were employed on
continuing contracts. Staff and workers were
paid according to a set scale and received
incremental annual increases. Casual
workers were employed as needed. This
system was criticised for not being
commercially focused, and for not providing
sufficient incentives for employees to improve
performance (South Pacific Project Facility
1999; Hughes and Thaanum 1995).
Soltai’s human resources policy, as
stipulated by the new Board of Directors,
abolished the staff/worker divide. All
employees were hired on contracts rather
than on a continuing basis—managers on
three-year contracts, shore-based skilled
administration employees and fleet workers
on two-year contracts, and cannery and
smoking factory workers on seasonal 10-
month or one-year contracts. Very few casuals
were hired (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July
2005), but new employees were hired on
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three-month probationary contracts and let
go after that if there was not enough work
(pers. comm., Dominic, 21 July 2005; pers.
comm., A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005; pers.
comm., J. Pina, 21 July 2005).
In 1999, Solomon Taiyo had two in-house
unions (one for staff, one for workers), with
which it negotiated remuneration and
conditions in a collective agreement. The new
Soltai board abolished the unions and
stipulated that all Soltai employment
contracts be negotiated individually. These
included allowances stipulated by
legislation, such as for accommodation and
education (pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–
19 July 2005), but some of the other benefits
Solomon Taiyo had provided, such as long-
service leave, disappeared in the transition
to short-term contracts. Annual pay
increments were replaced by incentive
payment bonuses; these, however, were not
paid because the company did not make a
profit (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July
2005). Without annual salary increments,
employees felt they were being paid less in
real terms because the costs of living—
particularly the cost of imports, given the
weakening Solomon Islands dollar—were
rising (pers. comm., D. Mamupio, 21–22 July
2005).6
By some measures Soltai’s human
resources policy was more commercially
sensible than Solomon Taiyo’s, but it is
questionable whether this contributed to
Solomon Islands’ economic development in
any way. One of Solomon Taiyo’s major
contributions to the Solomon Islands
economy had been to train technical,
supervisory and administrative staff, many
of whom were later employed elsewhere
(Barclay 2001, Solomon Taiyo Ltd 1998). The
fact that Soltai had managed to sustain itself
for four years without a foreign investor was
evidence that Solomon Taiyo had created a
pool of skilled and experienced Solomon
Islanders (pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19
July 2005). By 1999, Solomon Taiyo had
trained senior crew—engineers, fishing
masters and captains—to enable seven pole-
and-line vessels to be crewed entirely by
Table 1 Approximate employee numbers (nationals) by department, Solomon Taiyo
1999 and Soltai 2005
Solomon Taiyo 1999 Soltai 2005
Department Employees Department Employees
Cannery 896 Cannery 250
Fleet and cold store 816 Fleet and cold Store 330
Engineering 188 Engineering 56
Smoking 103 Smoking 80
Finance and commercial 18 Finance 22
Personnel 25 Human Resources 72
Quality assurance 51 Quality control 43
Casuals ~700 Casuals -
Total: 2,931 Total: 853
Source: South Pacific Project Facility, 1999. Report on the Valuation of the Solomon Government Investment in
Solomon Taiyo Limited, International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Sydney; Solomon Taiyo Limited,
1996. Solomon Taiyo Limited Corporate Plan 1996–2000, Solomon Taiyo Limited, Honiara; Solomon Taiyo
Limited, 1998; pers. comm., A. Kukui 19–22 July 2005.
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Solomon Islanders, and a couple with mixed
Solomon Islander and Filipino crew.
Soltai, like Solomon Taiyo, made use of
donor programs to develop its human
resources. Japan’s Overseas Fisheries
Cooperation Foundation (OFCF) training
courses resumed in 2004, and two Soltai staff
per year went to Japan for cannery and
engineering courses, sponsored by the Japan
Far Seas Purse Seining Association. In 2003
and 2004 Soltai received assistance from the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) to
train all crew and officers intensively in safety.
SPC also sponsored some Soltai employees
take courses in New Zealand (pers. comm, A.
Kukui, 19–22 July 2005). Staff from Soltai’s
Quality Control department were sent to
Honiara to participate in a European Union
project aimed at raising the Solomon Islands
Health Department to a Competent Authority
for testing food safety and hygiene
requirements for exports to the European
Union (pers. comm., I. Mamupio, 21–22 July
2005; pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005).
Soltai, however, pared back Solomon
Taiyo’s company-sponsored training program
to only those activities addressing the
company’s immediate training needs rather
than its future needs. This change was partly
a result of employees being shifted to shorter
fixed-term contracts. Instead of sponsoring
employees to take Solomon Islands College of
Higher Education (SICHE) courses in engineer-
ing and navigation, as Solomon Taiyo had
done, Soltai planned to employ graduates who
had paid their own way or had scholarships
from elsewhere (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22
July 2005). Soltai still provided opportunities
for employees to take aid-sponsored training,
but put less company resources into the
education and training of Solomon Islander
employees than had Solomon Taiyo. Soltai
thus contributed slightly less than Solomon
Taiyo to the development of human resources
in Solomon Islands.
Solomon Taiyo was often criticised for
its slow progress in localisation (by which
expatriate employees were replaced by locals
as they became skilled and experienced
enough), retaining expatriates in positions
that could be filled by locals. The main
difference between Soltai and Solomon Taiyo
in this respect was that Soltai had local
managers-in-training working under the
expatriate technical advisors, whereas
Solomon Taiyo had no such mentoring
program (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July
2005). Because Soltai was felt to be a national
company—the Managing Director described
Soltai as ‘the only truly national tuna
company in the Pacific’—localisation was
not given as high a priority as it had been
with Solomon Taiyo (Table 3; pers. comm.,
M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
The head of the organisation was
localised, and Soltai continued operations
Table 2 Total remuneration paid to Solomon Islanders, Solomon Taiyo 1998 and Soltai
2004
Solomon Taiyo 1998 Soltai 2004
SBD$’000 US$’000 SBD$’000 US$’000
20,000 4,000 11,970 1,634
Sources: South Pacific Project Facility, 1999. Report on the Valuation of the Solomon Government Investment in
Solomon Taiyo Limited, International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Regional Office, Sydney:4; pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005
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without some of the management posts
Solomon Taiyo had deemed necessary, but
most of the other management posts that had
been filled by expatriates in 1999 were still
filled by expatriates in 2005. Japanese
managers in the cannery and engineering
departments who had worked for Solomon
Taiyo in 1999 were brought back to work for
Soltai as technical advisors funded by OFCF.
Management of the smoking department had
not changed; the same Japanese man who had
managed Solomon Taiyo’s smoking
operations for fifteen years in 1999 was still
managing it for Soltai in 2005. This was
because since the 1980s Solomon Taiyo’s
katsuobushi production had been managed
under contract to a subsidiary of the katsuobushi
manufacturing giant Yamaki, which ran the
smoking process in return for buying all the
product at an agreed price. Japanese managers
employed by Maruha withdrew in 2000, but
the Yamaki subsidiary company decided not
to withdraw and continued the contract with
Soltai. The job of fleet manager, always held
by a Japanese national under Solomon Taiyo,
was held by a Solomon Islander for some time
under Soltai, but in 2005 this position was
vacant and Soltai was considering expatriates
for the position.
The fleet itself changed from being partly
to fully localised between 1999 and 2005, but
this was simply because the total number of
active vessels had dropped relative to the
number that had already been fully or
partially localised in 1999. When Solomon
Taiyo ceased operations, the fleet included
21 pole-and-line vessels and a group purse-
seine vessel that was not owned by the
company. When Soltai assessed the fleet
prior to reopening in 2001, it decided that
nine of the pole-and-line vessels were too far
beyond repair to be useful. Soltai kept the
best 12 vessels, but was only able to keep
nine or ten of these operational at any given
time (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005).
In 2005, two more vessels were deemed
unusable and tied up at one of the Noro
wharves, leaving only seven vessels
registered in that year (pers. comm., Licensing
Section, 28 July 2005).
Table 3 Expatriates and nationals in Solomon Taiyo 1999 and Soltai 2005
Position Solomon Taiyo 1999 Soltai 2005
Head of organisation Japanese Solomon Islander
Deputy head of organisation Solomon Islander Position gone
Human resources manager Solomon Islander Solomon Islander
Operations manager Japanese Position gone
Financial manager Australian Filipino
Commercial manager Japanese Position gone
Fleet manager Japanese Position unfilled
Cannery manager Japanese Japanese
Engineering manager Japanese Japanese
Smoking manager Japanese Japanese
Quality control manager Filipina Filipina
Fleet and engineering employees 900 Solomon Islanders 300 Solomon Islanders
31 Okinawans
30 Filipinos
Sources: Pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July  2005; Solomon Taiyo Limited, 1996. Solomon Taiyo Limited
Corporate Plan 1996–2000, Solomon Taiyo Limited, Honiara.
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Solomon Taiyo vs Soltai: other
economic benefits
While Solomon Taiyo’s greatest contribution
to the Solomon Islands economy over the
years was arguably employment, the
company also contributed tax revenues,
eased the country’s balance of payments
situation, paid royalties to reef-owning
communities for bait-fishing, and generated
a range of spin off businesses. Because
Soltai’s production was less than half
Solomon Taiyo’s, it contributed less of these
other economic benefits (Table 4).
The transition from Solomon Taiyo to
Soltai had mixed effects on economic
indicators in Noro. In 1999, the population
of Noro was around 3,500 but this had fallen
to 2,500 by 2004 (Noro Town Council 2004).
On the other hand, the number of businesses
operating in Noro increased between 1999
and 2005. The existing National Bank of
Solomon Islands branch was joined by a
branch of the ANZ Banking Group. A couple
of clothes manufacturing companies and
sales outlets had opened, and a successful
café was operating in the town. In addition,
whereas around 200 people a month were
using the local market to sell fresh produce
in 1999, around 800 people were selling in
the market each month in 2004 (Noro Town
Council 2004). Some of this increased activity
is, of course, probably explained by the
devaluation of the Solomon Islands dollar,
which encourages consumers to buy local
rather than imported goods.
Because it was smaller than Solomon
Taiyo, Soltai offered less opportunities for
local business. Solomon Taiyo had bought a
lot of fresh foods, especially vegetables, from
farming villages around the Noro base to feed
its 900 crew and the shore workers for whom
it was impractical to return home for lunch.
In 2005, there were not enough commuters
to warrant a lunch service, and the fleet
employed only 300 workers. The smaller fleet
also reduced the opportunities for villagers
to sell or trade fruit and vegetables for fish
with fishing vessels (pers. comm, A. Kukui,
19–22 July 2005).
Table 4 Contributions to the Solomon Islands economy, Solomon Taiyo in 1998 and
Soltai in 2004 (SBD$ ’000)
Solomon Taiyo 1998 Soltai 2004
Direct revenue (import/export duties, PAYE, 10,000 4,730
  withholding tax, licence fees, payments to
  the National Provident Fund)
Export receipts 150,711 67,770
Domestic payments (supplies for office, factory and
 fleet, fuel, utilities, telecommunications, port charges) 41,000a 35,170
Baitground royalties 1,500 300
a No such figure was available for 1998 so this figure is for 1994. In 1998 the payments would likely have
been greater due to inflation and greater production (export receipts were SBD$111,700,000 in 1994).
Sources: South Pacific Project Facility, 1999. Report on the Valuation of the Solomon Government Investment in
Solomon Taiyo Limited, International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Sydney; pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–
19 July 2005; Hughes, A. and Thaanum, O., 1995. Costly connections: a performance appraisal of Solomon Taiyo
Limited, Forum Fisheries Agency Report No. 95/54, Investment Corporation of Solomon Islands, Honiara.
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In 1999, Solomon Taiyo contracted the
commercial wing of a local martial arts
academy to provide the company’s security
services. This gave the people who managed
the security company—Sijomtak—
experience running a small business. Soltai,
however, did not contract Sijomtak, instead
employing its own security staff (pers. comm.,
I. Kuvi 1999, 22 July 2005). Soltai also brought
its cleaning services in-house, whereas
Solomon Taiyo had contracted these out to
local companies. So, although Soltai still
offered employment opportunities in these
sectors, it offered less opportunity for
independent private businesses in the area.
Another contract business that had been
quite large under Solomon Taiyo was
provision of transport by truck or canoe for
the commuters—a service that had been
contracted out to local businessman Billy Veo
under Solomon Taiyo. By 2005, however,
most employees lived in Noro, so Soltai only
needed to hire one canoe for transport. On
the other hand, commuting to and from Noro
was widely considered one of the negative
social impacts of Solomon Taiyo, largely
because the trips could take up to two hours
each way, adding greatly to the length of the
working day, and because the trucks and
canoes were uncovered, exposing the
passengers to the cold and rain in bad
weather (Sasabe 1993). Soltai has contributed
to development in the sense that it has
reduced this negative social impact, but other
negative impacts arising from the
modernising social encounter—alcohol
abuse, unplanned pregnancies, sexually
transmitted diseases, violence—are likely to
have reduced only pro rata with the reduction
in operations.7 One of the worst negative
social impacts of Solomon Taiyo was the
unsanitary and overcrowded housing of its
employees in Noro (Hughes and Thaanum
1995); Soltai has been unable to improve this
situation due to a lack of funds (pers. comm,
A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005).
Soltai’s commercial viability
Soltai in 2005 has contributed less to
Solomon Islands’ development than
Solomon Taiyo had in 1999, largely because
of its smaller scale (Table 5). This lower
production in turn reflected the company’s
tenuous commercial viability. Solomon Taiyo
had not been a very profitable venture, but it
had more or less covered its costs over time,
and was able to rely on loans from Maruha
to cover temporary shortfalls and finance
necessary maintenance and upgrades. The
nature of the industry means there are
inevitably years when companies make
losses, so a ‘cashed up’ investor is vital (pers.
comm., A. Wickham, 15 July 2005). Soltai
flagged to the national and Western Province
governments in mid 2004 that the company
would soon be in financial trouble if catches
did not improve, and asked for investment
to fund necessary renovations and repair
work (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005;
pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005),
but neither the national nor the Western
Province governments had spare resources
to invest in the company.
This compelled Soltai to seek aid donors
Japan and the European Union. Soltai
sought European Union funding to improve
its shore base in order to meet European
import standards under the European
Union-funded initiative noted earlier (pers.
comm., T. Mamupio, 21–22 July 2005) and
Japanese aid for production-related training
and fleet upgrades (pers. comm, A. Kukui,
19–22 July 2005).
In addition, the company brokered a
commercial solution in the form of a deal to
produce a new product for export to Italy.
The other large locally based tuna company
in Solomon Islands is National Fisheries
Development (NFD), which since the 1990s
has been owned by the multinational
company Trimarine. NFD had a couple of
Solomon Islands-registered purse-seine
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vessels catching plenty of fish that could be
classified under the Cotonou Agreement
Rules of Origin as Africa, Carribean and
Pacific (ACP) product and therefore avoid
the 24 per cent tariff on imports of processed
tuna to the European Union. Trimarine had
trading connections to buyers in Italy who
wanted cooked frozen loins to process into
cans. Loining is the first part of the process
for canning, so Soltai could supply this
demand from its cannery. Soltai, NFD and
Trimarine thus entered into an arrangement
whereby Soltai would buy fish from NFD,
turn it into loins, then sell it to Trimarine,
who then sold it to the Italian company. This
new market alleviated Soltai’s financial
situation somewhat in 2004, but because of
problems outlined further below, it did not
save the company. In 2005, Soltai need to
‘review and restructure’ in order to survive
(pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
The fleet
The biggest drain on Soltai’s resources was
its fleet. Purse-seine vessels are more
expensive than the pole-and-line vessels
Soltai used, but since purse-seining is a more
efficient (but potentially more environment-
ally destructive) method of catching fish it
ends up being the lower-cost method per
tonne of fish caught. NFD required far less
in terms of a shore base than Soltai because
its vessels froze their fish on board, then
transshipped the fish directly to carrier
vessels. Soltai’s vessels offloaded fish to be
stored on shore, so the company had to
employ people to run the cold store (Table 5).
Soltai’s fleet was not profitable because of
the type of fishing, the age of the vessels, and
the size of the fleet relative to the expense of
running a full shore base (although a larger
fleet might have been more cost effective)
(pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005; pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005; pers.
comm., A. Wickham, 15 July 2005). Soltai’s
management wanted to acquire a purse-seine
vessel but could not afford to buy one, which
led them to consider entering into a joint-
venture agreement with a foreign-owned
purse-seining company (pers. comm., M.
Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
In 2005, Soltai’s pole-and-line vessels
were all 20–30 years old and cost more to
maintain than they generated in catches.
Soltai had spent an average of SBD$3.6
million in repairs for the fleet each year since
2001 (pers. comm., A. Sevillejo, 19 July 2005).
Even so, this was only for necessary repairs;
it was not enough to keep the fleet running
at optimal performance. The lack of resources
available for maintenance was visible in the
rust streaking Soltai’s vessels—Solomon
Taiyo vessels had always been painted
regularly enough not to rust. A vicious cycle
Table 5 Comparison of commercial viability, Soltai and NFD
Company Vessel type Employees on fleet 2004 catch
and shore base (metric tonnes)
Soltai Pole and line 330 6,882
NFD Purse seine 75 20,000
Sources: Pers. comm., A. Wickham, 15 July 2005; Solomon Islands Fisheries Department, 2005. Statistics
provided by Edward Honiwala during fieldwork, 28 July. Solomon Islands Fisheries Department,
Government of Solomon Islands, Honiara.
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began. Lack of resources to maintain the fleet
fully meant it was not as productive, leading
to less revenue and so even less resources
were available for maintenance (pers. comm,
A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005). Compounding
its technical problems, the fleet in mid 2005
also lacked a manager.
Soltai’s request for Japanese aid to help
with the fleet situation resulted in Soltai’s
Managing Director and the Permanent
Secretary from the Fisheries Department
going to Japan in June 2005 to sign an
agreement for grant aid from Japan’s Official
Development Assistance fisheries aid
program. The grant of SBD$70 million
(US$9.5 million) was used to commission
two new pole-and-line vessels from a
Japanese shipyard, which are due to be
completed and delivered to Solomon Islands
in March 2006. The new vessels will be
cheaper to run because they have on-board
refrigeration capacity (Soltai’s older vessels
have ice holds) and also will require minimal
maintenance for the first few years (pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
Soltai management recognised that their
pole-and-line fleet was not commercially
viable and that any private investor would
immediately dismantle the fleet (pers. comm.,
M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005). Soltai senior
managers, however, thought that the fleet
brought benefits to Solomon Islands, and so
was worth of government support. They
cited the 300 jobs on the fleet, with 50 or so
more at the shore base, and the benefits those
jobs brought to workers’ families and to the
economy in general. They also cited fleet’s
benefits to villages near bait-grounds in terms
of the royalties the company paid to
landowners for use of lagoons for baitfishing
and the trade of fish for fruit and vegetables
in these villages.
Soltai’s need for a reliable, reasonably
priced supply of fish for processing was
another argument used to bolster the
argument for government support for the fleet
(pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005;
pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005). But
canneries around the world operate without
their own fleets, simply buying the fish from
external suppliers. In fact, Soltai had already
worked with the NFD and Trimarine in just
this kind of arrangement. Another option is
to tie distant-water access licenses to selling
part of the catch to local processors. Papua
New Guinea has done this with distant-
water fishing access licenses to ensure
supply for processing operations in Madang,
Wewak and Lae.
If Soltai’s fleet were to be dismantled, it
is likely that many of the crew, especially the
engineers, fishing masters and captains,
could find work in other fishing companies
or the merchant marine. The government
could sponsor their retraining. Indeed, many
former Solomon Taiyo and Soltai crew
already work for other companies like NFD.
Another option is for Solomon Islands to
emulate Kiribati, which requires distant-
water access fleets to employ a certain
proportion of domestic workers—trained
and recruited through schemes operated by
agents in Tarawa—as a condition of granting
a licence. Such an agency in Honiara could
employ former Soltai crew, and would also
provide a wider employment opportunity for
Solomon Islanders. Recruitment could be
dovetailed with the Solomon Islands College
of Higher Education’s (SICHE) marine
training program.
Although none of the managers
interviewed were willing to see Soltai lose
its fleet, the Human Resources Manager
discussed another option—restructuring the
fleet. Japan has pole-and-line fleet vessels
much larger than those used by Soltai, but
Soltai managers were not keen to seek this
kind of vessel, largely because moving
upscale would once again require foreign
investors and technical advisors. The
Human Resources Manager was in favour
of downscaling to more artisanal vessels,
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owned by local fishermen rather than the
company, and essentially outsourcing the
catching of fish to private individuals (pers.
comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005). There are,
however, potential problems with using
small-scale vessels to supply a cannery:
small boats cost much more to run per tonne
of fish than purse-seiners, it is difficult for
village-based small-scale operators to meet
the food safety and hygiene requirements for
product to be exported to the European Union
and the United States, and supply can be
irregular given village-based fishers’ custom
obligations and part-time fishing status.
Shore-based infrastructure
The aging fleet was not the only drain on
Soltai’s funds; the aging shore base
infrastructure was also a problem. Soltai had
spent SBD$2.4 million annually in repairs
to equipment on shore since 2001 (pers.
comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005), and still
several parts of the shore base were not
functioning or were functioning sub-
optimally. The waste water treatment plant
had not worked since 2000, and the fish meal
plant needed replacing. Lack of freezing
capacity was another constraint. The large
bins used for moving fish around on forklift
trucks needed to be replaced. The main wharf
had rusted and needed repairing (pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
Continued sales of loins to the European
Union required the Soltai factory to reach
European Union standards, which was a
challenge given the extent of repairs needed
(pers. comm., J. Pina, 21 July 2005).
Soltai’s processing capacity was 65
metric tons of whole fish a day into loins or
cans. In July 2005, however, the plant was
processing only 15 to 20 metric tonnes of fish
a day, largely due to a lack of freezing
capacity for storing finished loins (pers.
comm., J. Pina, 21 July 2005; pers. comm., M.
Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005). To meet
European Union importing requirements, the
loins had to be ‘blast frozen’ (dropped down
to temperature quickly) before being stored,
and a new blast freezer unit was required
before production could increase. Cans did
not require freezing, but the cashflow
problem constrained the company’s capacity
to buy ingredients or packing materials, thus
inhibiting production in 2005. Soltai had the
opportunity to supply cans and loins to
buyers in Italy, but the buyer wanted large
catering-size cans of 800 grams and 2,240
grams, and Soltai needed new equipment to
be able to produce tins of this size (pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
Any revenue Soltai raised was soon
swallowed up in repairs for the fleet and
shore base, and also went to loan repayments
left over from Solomon Taiyo. Solomon
Taiyo’s loans, some of which were for
employee housing developments in Noro,
were rolled together and rescheduled as one
debt with the National Provident Fund and
passed on to Soltai. From 2002 to 2004, Soltai
made SBD$2.5 million in loan repayments
each year to the National Provident Fund
(pers. comm., A. Sevillejo, 19 July 2005; pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
Freight and productivity
In addition to these internal problems, Soltai’s
commercial viability was also affected by two
external problems that had also plagued
Solomon Taiyo, and which made Solomon
Islands a less competitive business
environment than Thailand, the main
competitor country for canned tuna. These
problems were freight and productivity.
Freight in Solomon Islands suffered from lack
of an economy of scale. Bangkok, being a
major trade port, has container vessels coming
and going daily, charging competitive rates.
Noro was supposed to have one vessel a
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month, but that was sometimes cancelled. For
example, the vessel due to arrive in late June
2005 did not arrive and the next was not
scheduled until late August. Soltai’s useable
cold storage area was full, so the freight delay
blocked production. Furthermore, because
Solomon Islands is an out of the way
destination with few freight services, and
therefore little competition, freight companies
charge higher rates (Hughes and Thaanum
1995). This situation is only likely to improve
if greater activity at Noro raises the demand
for freight services, allowing economies of
scale to improve prices and reliability.
Soltai’s workers were skilled and
experienced, and the quality of their work
was high. Solomon Taiyo and Soltai had
gradually improved the ‘yield rate’—the
amount of export grade flesh yielded from
each fish—since the 1990s, but it was still
not at the level of Thailand’s operators.
Solomon Islander workers’ hourly wage
rates were competitive with those in
Thailand, but for several reasons the overall
cost of labour per tonne of product was higher
for Solomon Taiyo and Soltai than in
Thailand. One reason was that social custom
and labor regulations in Solomon Islands
dictated that workplaces provide more
allowances and other benefits to employees
than was the case in Thailand. For example,
the company provided workers’ transport to
and from the workplace. The company
collected the rubbish for the Noro residential
area, and in the past had helped fund the
local police service (Barclay 2001). These
factors add to overall labour costs in Solomon
Islands. Another facet of productivity is the
speed at which workers produce, and their
commitment to their cash work. Because
Solomon Islands workers tend to own land
and are thus not reliant on cash work for
survival, and because Solomon Islanders
tend to afford less priority to cash work than
workers elsewhere, they tend to work more
slowly and value cash work less than
workers elsewhere. This may change if
poverty levels rise in Solomon Islands or
changed tenure systems alienate people from
their land, but these would arguably not be
ideal outcomes. Perhaps clever human
resources strategies specifically tailored to
Solomon Islands’ economic culture may be
able to alleviate productivity problems.
Marketing
One of the key differences between Solomon
Taiyo and Soltai was that Solomon Taiyo had
been the beneficiary of Maruha’s global
trading networks and decades of seafood
marketing experience, whereas Soltai had
limited international trading and marketing
expertise. Solomon Islanders had been
involved in minor trading for procurement
and for sales of unprocessed fish in Solomon
Taiyo, and they continued to do this for Soltai.
In addition, Soltai had developed small new
markets for its canned product around the
Pacific and in Australia and New Zealand.
The most valuable part of the business,
however, was the trade to the lucrative
markets of Europe (for cans) and Japan (for
katsuobushi). Maruha had explicitly reserved
these trading relationships outside the joint
venture through separate marketing
agreements. Since the 1970s actual tuna
fishing has progressively grown less
profitable, with profit concentrating in the
trading and processing sectors (Schurman
1998).
Soltai’s commercial viability has
undoubtedly been hampered by its lack of
international trading and marketing
capacity. The company attempted to work
around the lack of international trade
connections and marketing expertise by
forming strategic alliances such as the
katuobushi deal with the Yamaki subsidiary,
the loining deal with NFD and Trimarine,
and the potential deal with a purse-seine
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company being explored in 2005. The
downside of these partnerships in the
absence of wider trading connections was
that Soltai could not ‘shop around’ for the
best deal.
If Soltai had access to specialist seafood
marketing expertise it might be able to
(re)create markets for pole-and-line product
on the grounds of environmental ‘friendliness’
by informing consumers in wealthy countries
of the environmental benefits of the pole-and-
line method and thus accessing that corps of
consumers willing to pay a premium for
environmentally friendly products. If pole-
and-line product were to be developed into a
brand, premium markets could drive a revival
in the pole-and-line method of fishing. Pole-
and-line katsuobushi could also possibly be
differentiated in the Japanese market this way.
Until now Solomon Islands pole-and-line
skipjack has not been marketed in Japan
specifically in terms of fishing method or
country of origin (pers. comm., Nakamura, 22
July 2005). There is already a market for fresh
pole-and-line skipjack in Japan, which is often
eaten as tataki (seared rare skipjack loins). The
Fijian company Tosa Bussan exports pole-
and-line tataki loins to Japan.
Marketing studies are needed to explore
these possibilities. A seafood marketing
expert could be engaged for the target export
destinations to research the options, report
on them and set up trade contacts. Another
option is for Soltai managers to utilise the
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat’s Pacific
Islands Trade and Information Commission
(PITIC), which maintains offices in Japan,
China, New Zealand and Australia and can
help in a range of ways, such as setting up
meetings with potential buyers (PITIC 2002).
Cook Islands has used PITIC offices in Japan
and China to set up successful trade
relationships for its marine product exports.
The Board of Directors
Another factor likely to have affected Soltai’s
commercial viability has been the composition
of the Board of Directors. According to
management the Soltai Board of Directors has
been much more ‘hands on’ in setting policy
for the company than was the Solomon Taiyo
Board of Directors. Solomon Taiyo was seen
as being directed from the Overseas
Operations Section of Maruha’s head office
in Tokyo, via its seconded managers in
Solomon Taiyo, with whom it maintained
daily contact (Barclay 2001). Having a local
Board of Directors direct Soltai rather than a
foreign company was seen as a victory in terms
of localisation (pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–
19 July 2005), but unfortunately it seems to
have been a loss in terms of commercial
viability. Both the ICSI and Western Province
representatives to the Board were appointed
on political grounds rather than on the quality
of commercial advice they could bring to
Soltai. More broadly, the Board’s members
have very little private sector track record of
any kind, and certainly none in the
international tuna industry.
If the Board of Directors were run
differently, Soltai might be able to avoid some
of the pitfalls of state-owned enterprises. If
the Board were selected with more attention
to previous success in private sector fishing
and/or seafood processing, the company’s
chances of success could be improved. Of
course, in the short to medium term, this
would require allowing foreigners sit on the
Board. Another solution would be to adopt
the model used by the PAFCO cannery/
loining plant in Fiji. PAFCO, as a state-
owned enterprise, has a Board of Directors
filled with government appointments, but the
Board does not set commercial strategy for
the company. Since 1999, commercial
strategy has been set by the US seafood
production giant Bumble Bee, which has a
relationship with PAFCO somewhat like the
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‘strategic alliance’ Soltai has with the Yamaki
subsidiary for katsuobushi production. One
or two Bumble Bee managers are stationed
at PAFCO to work with PAFCO managers to
run the company, while Bumble Bee buys or
arranges the marketing of all of PAFCO’s
exported loins and cans. PAFCO’s Board
thus has more of an oversight role, making
sure PAFCO’s directions are in the interests
of Fiji, while people with a track record of
experience and success in PAFCO’s field
make the commercial decisions.
Restructuring
In mid 2005, Soltai’s management were
considering options for restructuring to
improve profitability—namely, breaking the
company up into its constitutive production
units, because each production unit had
different commercial constraints and
opportunities (pers. comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–
19 July 2005). The fleet could clearly not be
privatised; the only alternative to having it
government owned and managed in the short
to medium term would be to break it up and
sell its few saleable assets. Soltai management
hoped the government would choose to
support the continued operation of the fleet,
with its engineering and wharf facilities, as
an exercise in social welfare for the 350
employees and their families, and for the
national self-esteem derived from owning and
running a fishing fleet. Considering the vast
amount of company revenue (SBD$12 million
since 2001) and aid money (SBD$78 million
from Taiwan and Japan since 2001) spent on
the fleet already, however, it is doubtful the
social and national benefits would outweigh
the financial costs of continuing the fleet at
government expense. Under current
conditions, there is no market willing to pay a
premium for pole-and-line caught fish, so even
if repairs and upgrades were financed by aid
donors the fleet would probably still run at a
loss.
Notwithstanding the upgrades and
repairs needed in the shore-based production
facilities, the cannery/loining plant could
probably be privatised or commercialised in
some way because of the great demand for
loins in the lucrative markets of the European
Union and United States. Selling the factory
outright would probably not be the best
option since in its current state of decrepitude
it could garner only a low price and because
a private owner could simply strip/sell the
assets and shut the operation down should
it see fit (a politically unpopular outcome). A
better option might be to lease the company
to an experienced company, at a low rent at
first, on the understanding that the lessee
would undertake necessary upgrades. Then,
if that company chose to withdraw, the
government could safeguard the jobs and the
economic contribution the operation
generates. A government-owned sashimi
packing plant in Marshall Islands, Fish Base,
has been managed in this way for more than
a decade. Soltai’s smoking factory had
already effectively been run by private sector
interests for many years, so it was clearly
profitable—to the Japanese production
management and buying company if not
necessarily to Soltai. Both loining/canning
and smoking thus have the potential to be
commercially viable through partnerships
between the government shareholding
agency ICSI and private sector investors.
Conclusion
In the first couple of years it was so
exciting. The government and the public
thought we would fail in six months
without the Japanese. It felt so good to
prove that we could make a go of it (pers.
comm., M. Sibisopere, 18–19 July 2005).
Solomon Islands and other Pacific island
countries hoping to generate economic
development from domestic tuna fisheries
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and onshore processing can learn from the
factors that have affected the economic
sustainability of Solomon Taiyo and Soltai.
Some of the reasons for Soltai’s financial
trouble in 2005 were intractable. Neither the
Board of Directors nor Soltai’s managers could
do much about Solomon Islands’ high-cost
production environment, for example.
Similarly, the Solomon Islands government
has been unable to make up for the loss of
Maruha’s cash for capital investment and
covering losses during down cycles and its
international trading and marketing expertise.
Soltai’s senior managers strongly
believed Soltai should remain a state-owned
enterprise.
If the government doesn’t put some
money in soon Soltai will have to be
privatised. This would be a big loss to
the nation, we should be proud of Soltai
as a national company, and we should
get the benefits from it being a fully
national company. I would like to hand
Soltai over to the next generation after
I retire (pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22
July 2005).
Unfortunately, running the company as a
state-owned enterprise has risked losing the
economic, and psychological, benefits of
national ownership. While a wholly
nationally-owned successful Soltai would
boost national self-esteem, the other side of
the coin is that a failed nationally-owned
Soltai will compound negative stereotypes
about Solomon Islanders being unable to run
businesses.
Soltai needs more commercial expertise
and capital. Currently the best place to source
these inputs is from foreign private sector
investors, and private investors will require
a measure of control over the company to find
the risk of investing worth bearing. Some
hard decisions must be made if Soltai is to be
saved, but given the current economic
situation in Solomon Islands, not saving the
company will be even harder. It is imperative
that the Solomon Islands government take
action now to make Soltai more commercially
viable, or risk losing the company and its
economic benefit potential altogether.
Notes
1 Ostensibly caused by ‘ethnic’ tensions, it is
more accurately described as a collapse of
state functions, especially the law, order and
justice systems.
2 The higher cost of pole-and-line product was
also offset by tariff advantages in the
European market because Solomon Islands
was an ‘Africa, Caribbean and Pacific’ (ACP)
country under the Lome Convention. For
further information about this trade situation
see (Grynberg 1998).
3 For further details on the financial record of
the company, the company structure and
reasons for its lack of profitability see
(Hughes and Thaanum 1995; South Pacific
Project Facility 1999; Barclay 2001).
4 The arrangements for Soltai’s ownership
took place when the national government
was at its most dysfunctional, between the
coup and the Townsville Peace Agreement.
The head of ICSI declined to be interviewed
about Soltai in 2005, so it was not possible to
confirm when and how the shareholding was
transferred to the Western Province.
5 Managers from Soltai and the other large
domestic skipjack fishing company National
Fisheries Development said that their catches
had been low from 2003–05. Interestingly,
no such drop in productivity for the skipjack
fishery was noted by national or regional
fisheries data reports (Diake 2005; Molony
2005).
6 One group of workers were paid better
under Soltai than they had been under
Solomon Taiyo, those in the smoking
department. Under Solomon Taiyo there had
been persistent rumours that workers in the
smoking department had worse conditions
than workers in the rest of the company, and
Soltai was able to ensure financial recompense
(pers. comm, A. Kukui, 19–22 July 2005).
7 For more information on negative social
impacts see Barclay (2004).
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